PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
IN DIVERSITY ACTIONS: A TILTYARD FOR
THE KNIGHTS OF ERIE
Only three years separate the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.,' and its subsequent overruling in Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l 2 The exhaustive
opinions in these two cases manifest continuing disagreement about (1)
the existence and nature of a federal standard of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and (2) the applicability of a federal standard in a diversity
action.3
Jaftex involved an attempt to join a North Carolina corporation as a
third party defendant in a diversity action brought in the Southern District of New York. The district court dismissed the corporation, holding
that although it was subject to suit under federal law it was not subject
1 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).

320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc).
3 The opinions in each case are by Judge Friendly and the late Judge Clark, two
scholarly judges long associated with the elements of the controversy-the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the "Erie doctrine," and diversity jurisdiction. Remarkably, both
Judge Friendly, in January of this year, and Judge Clark, in 1945, chose the application of state law problem, symbolized by Erie, as their topic when invited to give the
annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture before the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York. For reports of their addresses see Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts:
The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YAE hJ.265 (1946); Friendly,
In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 19 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
64 (1964) (as refreshing a treatment of the problem as the title indicates).
Judge Clark's association with the Federal Rules began with a provocative article
calling for full utilization of the rule-making power Congress had granted the Supreme
Court, written at a time when it appeared that the power might be half-heartedly
exercised, if at all. Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387,
1291 (1935). An account of the genesis of the rules can be found in 1 BARRON &
HoLrzoFF, FEDERAL PRacrcE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1-5 (Wright ed. 1960) [hereinafter
cited as BARRON & HOLTOFF]. Judge Clark, then Dean of the Yale Law School, served
as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure that drafted the
original Federal Rules and was a member of the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure until his death. He spoke and wrote often in support of the
rules. Some of his articles particularly relevant to the problem of state law and the
rules include: FederalProceduralReform and States' Rights; to a More Perfect Union,
40 TExAs L. REv. 211 (1961); Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUm. L.
REv. 435 (1958); The .Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417 (1940);
ProceduralAspects of the New Slate Independence, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1230 (1940);
The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297 (1938).
Judge Friendly is the author, of The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARv.
L. Rnv. 483 (1928).
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under New York law, the application of which was required by "the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.14 Although the court of appeals
held that personal jurisdiction existed under either New York or federal
law, thus rendering the choice moot, it went on to discuss which law
should be applied. The late Judge Clark's majority opinion directed the
district court to apply a federal standard. Judge Friendly, in concurring,
maintained that state law should be applied.
In Arrowsmith the court seemed to welcome an opportunity to reconsider Jaftex. Arrowsmith, a Maryland resident, had brought a libel action
in the Vermont district court against United Press International, a New
York corporation. The defendant moved for dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction, improper venue and failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Without first considering jurisdiction and venue,
the district court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to state
a claim.5 On appeal, a majority of the panel requested and obtained en
banc consideration. Holding that the lower court erred by failing to
pass first upon the claims of improper personal jurisdiction and venue,
the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a consideration
of those issues. Most of Judge Friendly's majority opinion is devoted to
an advance determination of the standard by which the district court
is to decide whether it has jurisdiction over the defendant. He concluded
that the "alternative ground of decision in Jaftex, asserting a 'federal
standard' for jurisdiction over foreign corporations in ordinary diversity
cases, should be overruled." 6 Judge Clark dissented, adhering to the views
expressed in his majority opinion in Jaftex.
In both cases Judges Clark and Friendly agreed that if there were a
federal statute or rule "expressly or by fair implication" 7 providing a
standard of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations or even showing "an intent that the federal courts are 'to fashion federal law ... '
on the subject, that authority would govern in diversity as well as federal
question cases. Nevertheless, despite this concession to the supremacy of

",s

4 Shawe v. Wendy Wilson, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Obviously this
is the only situation in which the choice between state and federal standards is
significant. If the defendant is subject to suit under both or neither, the choice is
merely academic. For purposes of the discussion relating to choice of standards this
comment will indulge in the customary assumption that the "federal standard" requires
less connection with the state than does the state standard.
5 205 F. Supp. 56 (D. Vt. 1962).

6 320 F.2d at 225. Judges Waterman and Smith concurred in the result. Id. at 244.
7

Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 1963).

8 Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 517 (2d Cir. 1960) (concurring

opinion).
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congressional provisions for jurisdiction over corporations, Judge Friendly
did not believe that such a directive existed. 9
I.

THE FEDERAL STANDARD OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER CORPORATIONS

A federal standard has been applied in federal question cases where,
in practice, there is little pressure to conform to state law.' 0 But before
the nature of the standard and its possible congressional authorization
can be ascertained, a preliminary understanding of terminology must
be reached.
A challenge to a court's jurisdiction over a person is fundamentally
a query whether the court has the power to enter a valid default judg12
ment against him. 1 Assuming appropriate subject matter jurisdiction,
two conditions are essential to the validity of a default judgment: (1)
9 "No federal statute or Rule of Civil Procedure speaks to the issue either expressly
or by fair implication." Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir.
1963).
10 In theory the application of state law problem is not confined to diversity actions.
The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958), requires the application of state
laws as rules of decision in civil actions in federal courts "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide."
The opinion in Erie itself states, "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State." 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). (Emphasis added.) See Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the
Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. R.v. 427, 453 (1958); Snepp, The Law Applied in the Federal
Courts, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 165, 169 (1948); Vestal, Erie R?. R. v. Tompkins-A
Projection, 48 IowA L. Rxv. 298 (1963); Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1031 (1949). See
generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 577-708
(1953) [hereinafter cited as HART & WEcHSLER].
It would seem that if there is no congressionally authorized standard of personal
jurisdiction over corporations the argument for application of the state standard would
be equally applicable, although less hospitably received, in federal question cases as
in diversity cases.
11 "Jurisdiction over the defendant ..
connotes the requisite power or control to
render an in personam ... judgment .... " MOORE & VESTAL, MOORE'S MANUAL § 7.01,
at 382 (1962). In cases, the usual form of the statement is that personal jurisdiction is
the power of the court over the parties. E.g., Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166
F. Supp. 790, 794 (N.D. Ill. 1958). As MooRE & VESTAL indicates, what is meant is power
to enter a valid judgment even if the person fails to appear.
12 Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and adjudicate the kind of controversy. In the federal courts, controversies between citizens of different states are
considered to be a kind of controversy which may be adjudicated in district courts.
Hence diversity jurisdiction is subject matter jurisdiction. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1946).
For purposes of determining whether diversity exists when there is a corporate
party, Congress has provided that "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958). The question of the citizenship of the
corporation for diversity purposes is independent of the question of this comment,
which deals with the standard by which it is to be determined whether a corporation
is within the personal jurisdiction of the court.
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adequate notice to the defendant; 13 and (2) the existence, usually at the
time of notification, 14 of a specified relation-e.g., proximity-between
the person and the court rendering the judgment.' 5 Confusion results
from the use by the courts of the term "personal jurisdiction" to represent both conditions. But the question whether the person has received
adequate notice'0 is quite independent of the question whether there
exists between the person and the court a specified relation1? that will
support a valid default judgment. 18 Since the first condition is already
adequately identified by the term "notice," clarity will be promoted by
reserving the term "personal jurisdiction" to represent only the second
condition.
The first question presented is why any particular relation between a
court and an intended defendant is required. A fundamental source of
this requirement has been the practical limitation of territorial sovereignty; the assertion of one sovereignty's power outside its territorial
limits is an invasion of the domain of another sovereignty. 19 This was
13 "A judgment is void unless a reasonable method of notification is employed and

a reasonable opportunity to be heard afforded to persons affected."

RESTATEMENT, JUDG-

§ 6 (1942); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
"In addition to some appropriate connection between the defendant and the legal
unit in which his case is pending, due process requires that he be given reasonable
notice of the proceedings in order that he may make his defense." 2 FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1081 (1961).
14 See, e.g., Ezell v. Rust Eng'r Co., 75 F. Supp. 980, 982 (W.D.S.C. 1948). But see
French v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
15 L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959);
see text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
18 For the purposes of discussion in this comment it will be assumed that the corporation, through a proper representative, has been given actual notice of the actionan assumption justified by the corporation's invariable resistance of the action in a
special appearance-and that the method of notification is constitutionally acceptable.
It is possible to upset a judgment in a case in which there has been actual notice
by attacking the statutory manner in which notice is to be given as not calculated to
give actual notice, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
but this is a point independent of the question of this comment.
17 Familiar examples of these relations are presence or domicile within the forum
area for an individual and doing business within or minimum contacts with the forum
area for a corporation. Because of the obvious role of the forum area in stating these
relations, they are usually thought of as relations to the area in which the court is
located rather than relations to the court itself.
18 Substantially synonymous with this query are questions whether a defendant is
subject or amenable to suit or whether it is subject or amenable to service of process.
The questions to be considered in this comment can, on the basis of the analysis in
the text above, be accurately but unconventionally restated as (I) what relations have
been specified by federal law to be required between a foreign corporation and a
district court to support a valid default judgment and (2) whether state or federal law
should specify the required relation in a diversity action.
19 Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cni. L. REV. 775,
795-96 (1955).
IENTS
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certainly the historically dominant influence in the development of the
restrictions-later read into the fourteenth amendment-on the power
of a state over persons outside its boundaries.2 0 Under territorial sovereignty principles-apparently read into the fifth amendment-all that
would be required for jurisdiction over a person to exist in a federal
court would be that the person be within the territorial limits of the
United States.2 1 In the case of a corporation this would automatically
be satisfied by incorporation in one of the states. Acceptance of this view
means that such a corporation is within the personal jurisdiction of any
district court unless the federal system has imposed additional restrictions.
Nevertheless, it might be argued, by analogy to Supreme Court decisions on the constitutional restrictions on state court personal jurisdiction, that an additional constitutional limitation exists.2 2 The Supreme

Court has made fairness to the defendant a factor in determining whether
he is subject to the personal jurisdiction of state courts.23 If such decisions
were taken as recognizing a fourteenth amendment due process right
not to litigate in an unreasonably inconvenient forum, it might be argued
that the defendant in federal courts is afforded a parallel right by the
same clause of the fifth amendment.2 4 But no such constitutional right
has thus far achieved recognition in the federal system. In situations in
which Congress has provided nationwide personal jurisdiction, the "right"
does not seem to have even been claimed. 25 The absence of such claims
may be due to the large odds against their succeeding; Congress has not
allowed district courts such jurisdiction without good reason to do soi.e., encouraging enforcement of federal laws or facilitating multi-party
litigation. 26 The true test of the constitutionality of a nationwide jurisdiction provision would be presented if such a measure were provided
20 Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal
Process, 8 ViLL. L. REv. 520, 531-32 (1963).
21 Green, Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14
VAND. L. REy. 967, 972, 986 (1961). This is consistent with the frequent dicta of the
Supreme Court that there would be no constitutional objection to giving the district
courts nationwide service of process. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
442 (1946); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); United States
v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300,

328 (1888).
22 Abraham, supra note 20, at 533-35.
23

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

24 Abraham, supra note 20, at 538-35.
25 Although there are a number of federal statutes which provide nationwide service
of 'process, 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
4.42, at 1085-36 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE], there appear to have been no cases raising a due process objection to
service outside the state in which the court sits. Abraham, supra note 20, at 535.
26 Congress has provided nationwide personal jurisdiction-i.e., service of process-in order to facilitate enforcement of particular federal laws, e.g., 26 Stat. 210 (1890),
15 U.S.C. § 5 (1958) (Sherman Act); 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958) (Clayton
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in ordinary diversity litigation without reference to a particular public
interest. The question of a constitutionally based claim of unfairness
which might be asserted by a Californian being forced under such a provision to litigate in New York is still open, 27 but until such a situation
occurs the case law indicates that a reasonable connection with the
United States is all that is required to satisfy the constitutional "federal
standard." 28
Nonetheless, there are sources other than the Constitution which may
require connections between particular district courts and corporations
being sued in them; these may be statutes, rules or self-imposed requirements of the federal courts.
Section 1391(c) of the Judicial Code, generally taken to deal only with
venue, could be construed to provide a standard of personal jurisdiction
29
over corporations.
Act), and in order to serve the public interest in expediting certain kinds of litigation
where the states cannot do so, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (Federal Interpleader Act); 28
U.S.C. § 1695 (jurisdiction over corporation in shareholder's action).
FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(f) has recently been amended to provide jurisdiction over third
parties sought to be joined under rules 13(h), 14 and 19 who can be served within 100
miles of the courthouse, regardless of state boundaries. Despite the public interest in
the federal courts performing the distinctly federal function of expediting multi-party
litigation, the validity of this measure has not been, thought to be so well settled as
to foreclose discussion of its validity. See Abraham, supra note 20; Kaplan, Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,1961-1963 (pt. 1), 77 Hxv. L. REv. 601,
631-34 (1964); Vestal, Expanding the JurisdictionalReach of the Federal Courts: The
1963 Changes in FederalRule 4, 38 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 1053, 1059-76 (1963).
27 See Abraham, supra note 20, at 523. This question is unlikely to be litigated since
Congress has now provided for transfer of actions "in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1958). Arguments based upon inconvenience and unfairness can be
founded more firmly upon these statutes. See Comment, 30 U. CH. L. Ray. 735, 743
(1963).
28 The correct interpretation of the language of fairness to the defendant in the
state personal jurisdiction cases is probably that fairness is merely a factor taken into
consideration in determining the constitutional limits on state power and not an additional constitutional limitation to be reckoned with once it is found the defendant is
within the state's power. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (Restrictions
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts "are more than a guarantee of immunity
from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.") The analogous application of the doctrine of these cases to the federal situation would be that fairness would be a factor
in determining whether the United States has power over a defendant.
This is not to say that a constitutional right not to litigate in an unreasonably
inconvenient forum may not be emerging. While the shift in emphasis from the
territorial boundaries of the state to state interests and the convenience of the defendant has generally resulted in an expansion of the traditional limits on state power,
the language could be used in a proper case to make a strong argument in favor of
denying the state power to exercise jurisdiction where the inconvenience to the
defendant is great and the state's interest is minimal.
29 See, e.g., Paragon Oil Co. v. Panama Ref. & Petrochem. Co., 192 F. Supp. 259
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it
is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,
and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of
such corporation for venue purposes.3 0
Were it not for labels such as venue and personal jurisdiction, the first
half of the subsection would seem to resolve any question as to the
standard by which a corporation's amenability to suit is to be determined,
with the second part merely silencing objections to venue in those districts in which it may be sued. If this interpretation is a "literalism," '
then surely a view that the provision has nothing to do with personal
jurisdiction because it is in a section of the code entitled "Venue generally" is a "labelism." But restricting the statute's scope to that indicated
by its title seems justified by its historical setting. In Neirbo Ca. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,32 the Supreme Court, in 1939, held that
a corporation had waived any objection it might have had to venue in
the district court when it appointed an agent to receive service of process
pursuant to a state qualification to do business statute. While of benefit
to some plaintiffs, the case produced the anomaly that corporations that
did business without complying with the state law were in a better position than those which had complied, since they preserved their objections
to venue in the federal courts. It is generally felt that section 1391(c) was
enacted to eliminate this anomaly and that it did not do away with the
additional requirement of personal jurisdiction; 33 indeed, so long as
venue may be laid in the plaintiff's district of residence, in a diversity
action, the defendant's only protection lies in the personal jurisdiction
requirement. It should be apparent, however, that in the federal system
there is an intriguing and confusing similarity between personal jurisdiction and venue; both serve to locate the proper place for trial, often by
literally the same standard. 34
80 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
s1 Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 518 (2d Cir. 1960).
32 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
33 See Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1958); Bar's
Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 710, 713-14 (N.D. Cal. 1957); 1 MoosE
0.142 [5.-3]; Note, 69 HAiv. L. REv. 508, 517-19 (1956); Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1094, 1099
n.18 (1958); cf. Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953).
34 It is customarily understood that "doing business" for venue purposes means
something different from "doing business" for purposes of personal jurisdiction, although a number of courts have failed to see the, distinction. See Judge Friendly's

advice to the district court on remand in Arrowsmith and cases there cited. 320 F.2d
at 234.
It might be asked what difference it makes whether location of the proper place
for a trial is accomplished in one step or two as long as the supposedly more restrictive venue must always be satisfied. See Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollock, 148 F.
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An infrequently suggested source of a congressional limitation on district court personal jurisdiction is section 1693 of the Judicial Code. This
is the antique, but not entirely anachronistic,35 "civil arrest" provision,
now found in a chapter of the code entitled "Process."
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, no person shall
be arrested in one district for trial in another in any civil action
in a district court.36
This provision has descended without significant change from the original
Judiciary Act. 37 To derive a standard of personal jurisdiction over corSupp. 710, 713-14 (N.D. Cal. 1957) ("The question of jurisidiction becomes academic
when merged in the larger question of proper venue . . . .'). Until 1887 venue and
personal jurisdiction in the federal courts were "scarcely distinguishable." HART &
WECHSLER 948. More recently the distinctions which had arisen have been disappearing.
Convenience of the parties has become as much a factor in determining personal jurisdiction as-it is in determining venue. See Lone Star Package Car. Co. v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 154-55 (5th Cir. 1954). Nor does the lack of personal jurisdiction
necessarily result in dismissal of the action. In several recent cases transfer has been
ordered. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962); Hydrotherm, Inc. v. BastianMorley Co., 207 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Comment, Change of Venue in Absence
of Personal Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) and 1406(a), 30 U. Ci. L. REv. 735
(1963). Both are personal privileges of the defendant which may be waived. 1 MooRE
0.140 [1.-i].
Apparently only two distinctions remain. In a multi-district state-a defendant will
be subject to personal jurisdiction in any district, but venue requires that the trial be
held in a district in which it is doing business. And the objection to personal jurisdiction is the only protection against unreasonable inconvenience available to a defendant
as of right in a diversity action in which venue may be properly laid in the district
of the plaintiff's residence. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958). (The elimination of the district
of plaintiff's residence as a proper place for venue has been proposed recently. ALI,
STUDY OF THE DIvISIoN OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1304(a)
& note (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963).)
A great deal of confusion surrounds venue and personal jurisdiction (whether as
an independent requirement or as a limitation on service of process). Compare, e.g.,
Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ill. 1958), with Houston
Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963) (Query the legitimacy of using
a Supreme Court pronouncement of the constitutional limitation of a state's power
over a corporation as a precedent for interpretation of the federal venue statute.).
Since both concepts function in the federal system to locate the proper district for
trial, it seems that a single comprehensive provision to perform that function would
be a great improvement. See Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal
Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 VAND. L. REv. 608, 628-29 (1954); Note, Doing Business as a Test of Venue and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations in the Federal
Courts, 56 CoLu, . L. REv. 394, 420 (1956).
35 In some states commencement of certain civil actions by capias ad respondendum
is still provided by statute, e.g., 2A N.J.S.A. § 15-41, 43 (1952). Section 1693 may not
be entirely obsolete since a state's capias procedure might be available in the federal
court under the provision in rule 4(d)(7) for service of summons or "other like process"
in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court is held.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7).
36 28 U.S.C. § 1693 (1958).
37 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
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porations from it one must first construe it as applicable to the commencement of an action not only by arrest of the defendant pursuant to
a writ of capias ad respondendum, but also by service of ordinary process.
Although this is a colorable construction-a personal jurisdiction requirement may well take the form of a restriction upon service of process-two
factors weigh against it. First, the arrest of the defendant in a civil action
is a somewhat drastic measure which might merit special limits on its
use. Even more significantly, restrictions upon service of process are now
38
treated in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
None of the rules purports on its face to deal with personal jurisdiction
over corporations, 39 but when it is recalled that it is an additional restriction upon the district court's constitutional power over a corporation
which is sought, it will be seen that rule 4(f), entitled "Territorial Limits
40
of Effective Service," imposes such a restriction.
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere
within the territorial limits of the state in which the district
court'is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United
States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that
state . ... 41
This subdivision, read together with subdivision (d)(1),42 which provides
for the manner in which the summons shall be delivered to an individual,
38 The statutory support for a federal standard of personal jurisdiction over corporations is, to say the least, tenuous. Even if § 1693 were construdd as applying to all
modes of commencing an action, how it treats jurisdiction over corporations would not
be apparent. A requirement that a corporation be present within the district by doing
business there might be inferred, but it is certainly not implied. The most that can
be found in this section is congressional authority upon which a standard of personal
jurisdiction, using the district as the significant area, could be constructed, but this
is not likely unless the standard seeker is both highly motivated and unaware of the
existence of better foundations: e.g., ED. R. Crv. P. 4(f).
39 The subject has never been specifically dealt with by rule or statute. Of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, (1789) it has been said: "The most important
omission on the part of the drafters of the Bill which occurred in connection with
the Section relative to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts-an omission which had
most grave results and which necessitated decisions tantamount to judicial legislation
by the Supreme Court-was the neglect to make any provision regarding jurisdiction
as to corporations." Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciary Act of
1789, 37 HAgv. L. REv. 49, 89 (1923). This original failure to address the problem can
be attributed to the insignificance of the corporate form at that time, Williston, History
of the Law of Business CorporationsBefore 1800, 2 HAv. L. REv. 149, 165-66 (1888)
(only 6 corporations chartered in America before 1787), but there is no such excuse now.
40 See MooRE & VESTAL, MOOE'S MANUAL
6.02 (1962).
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
42 "Service shall be made as follows: Upon an individual . . . by delivering a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof
at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein .... " FEn. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
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makes it reasonably plain that the basic relations required for the existence of power to enter a valid default judgment against an individual
are presence or domicile within the state.
As to corporations, subdivision (d)(3) provides that service of process
shall be made
Upon a domestic or foreign corporation.. . by delivering a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process ....43
In First Flight Co. v. National CarloadingCorp.4 4 the court took the view
that if a corporation has the constitutionally required minimum contacts
with the United States the only additional personal jurisdiction requirement is that an agent be handed a copy of the summons and complaint
within the state in which the district court is held. This is all the rule
expressly requires; however, the facts of the case fail to give unqualified
support to this view since the situation presented was the relatively easy
one in which the corporation maintained within the state a permanent
office with resident agents. The true test of the court's view would be
presented if a responsible agent were served with process while traveling
-perhaps by air 45-through a state with which his corporation had no
connection. While a literal interpretation of subdivisions (d)(3) and (f)
would seem to permit the district court to enter a default judgment
should the corporation ignore the notice, no case has been found so
holding.
Rather, the clear weight of authority holds that subdivision (d)(3) provides only the manner of notifying a corporation of a suit and does not
declare the circumstances under which it Issubject to suit.4 6 Although
notice must, under subdivision (f), be given within the state, something
more than mere casual presence of an agent is required. This "something more" is the content of the jurisdiction standard. The usual
approach to developing it has been to recognize the notification limitation in rule 4(f) and infer that the corporation must be "present" within
the state, presence being manifested by "doing business." 47 But the con43 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
44 209 F. Supp. 730, 739 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
45 Cf. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
46 "Rule 4(d)(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure tells how service of process is to
be made upon a corporation which is subject to service; but it does not tell when
the corporation is so subject." HART & WECHSLER 959; accord, Smith v. Alexandrian,
30 F.R.D. 553 (N.D. Ill. 1961). See also 1 BARRON & HoLTzorr § 179, at 699.
47 2 MooRE
4.25. This is, of course, the approach of Judge Clark in Jaftex, 282
F.2d at 512, 516, and in Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 238-39. It will be noted, however,
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nection between the rule and the content of the standard is not so dear
as to nullify the notion that the required relation is not specified by the
rule and may be developed independently.
A review of lower federal court decisions, particularly in federal question cases, indicates that in some of them the restriction on constitutionally permissible personal jurisdiction was wholly judge-made and
strongly influenced by Supreme Court decisions48 on the constitutional
limitations of state court power over corporations. Courts holding this
view appear to be aware of the anomaly of construing fourteenth amendment limitations as binding on federal courts, but they still employ the
language of those limitations. The best example is found in Lone Star
Package Car Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,49 a federal question case in
which the propriety of requiring the corporate defendant to defend the
action in the particular district court was determined by "basic principles
of fairness." The court credited the phrase to International Shoe Co. v.
Washington5o and acknowledged that that case dealt with constitutional
limitations on state court jurisdiction, but went on to state that "the
broad statements of policy expressed.., seem to us to be extended also
to cases where the jurisdiction of the federal courts depends upon federal
law." 51 Other courts have imposed a requirement of "doing business"
without attributing it to the compulsion of any higher authority.52
The preceding analysis reveals that the three sources-statutes, rules
and judge-made law-may be and have been used as a basis for a federal
standard of personal jurisdiction over corporations. The inquiry now
narrows to the question significant in a diversity case: Whether there
is a congressionally authorized standard sufficiently clear that it may be
said that Congress has "otherwise required or provided," 53 thus precluding the question of the applicability of state law.
The most likely basis for a congressionally authorized5 4 standard is
that he preferred to use the district as the significant area, apparently out of an
inclination to rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1693.
48 E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 810 (1945).
49 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954). The Lone Star approach was employed in Goldberg
v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1961), also a federal question case.
50 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
51 212 F.2d at 155. (Emphasis added.)
52 See, e.g., Pike v. New Eng. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 669 (D. Mass. 1950).
53 See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
54 The rules have at least passive congressional authorization. They are promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to a grant of authority from Congress. 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (1958). Once promulgated, rules and amendments are transmitted to Congress and
take effect after a stated period of time if Congress takes no adverse action. Ibid. Faced
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rule 4(f).55 By far the most common form of any personal jurisdiction
standard is that of a condition to effective service of process or to amenability to service.5 6 That the state is the significant area in the standard
points to rule 4(f) as its source, since prior to the rule's adoption the
57
district clearly was regarded as the significant area.
If rule 4(f) explicitly provided the manner in which it applied to corporations, it, rather than state law, would dearly govern. 58 In lovino v.
Waterson59 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with an
analogous situation, substitution of a non-resident administratrix for a
deceased party in a diversity action. The question was essentially one of
personal jurisdiction over the administratrix, who could not be served
within New York, the location of the action. Personal jurisdiction did not
exist under New York law, but did exist under federal rule 25(a)(1) which
dearly provides that service upon a party to be substituted for a deceased
party may be made in any judicial district. In an opinion written by
Judge Friendly the court applied rule 25(a)(1) and upheld jurisdiction.
Rule 4(f) is not as lucid regarding the relations required to give a
court power over a corporation as is rule 25(a)(1) regarding substitution,
but if its application requires only interpretation, an argument that it
would accordingly prevail over state law could be based on the recent
Supreme Court decision in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent.60 The main issue in this diversity action was whether the defendants, Michigan farmers, had consented to be sued in New York by
appointing a local agent to receive process. The supposed appointment
with the question of the rules' status in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940), the
Supreme Court, split five to four, stated that a rule "has the force of a federal statute."
Accord, American Fed. Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
873 (1954); Note, 62 HARV. L. Rnv. 1030, 1031 (1949).
55 See MooRE & VESTAL, MOORE'S MANUAL
6.02 (1962).
56 See, e.g., Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 710, 712 (N.D. Cal.
1957) (question put as whether "amenability to process" is to be determined by state
or federal standards).
57 Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 410 n.109 (1935).
58 This is so whether Erie is considered to be a constitutional doctrine or not, because
of the non-substantive nature of personal jurisdiction. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l,
320 F.2d at 226: "Despite contrary intimations as to our position in the dissent, we
fully concede that the constitutional doctrine announced in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins .. .
would not prevent Congress or its rule-making delegate from authorizing a district
court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an ordinary diversity case
although the state court would not .
J..."
judge Friendly has since characterized his
reliance on Erie in Jaftex as "an aberration later righted, 320 F.2d at 226." Friendly,
In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 19 RrcoaD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64,
95 n.23 (1964). But see Abraham, supra note 20, at 530.
59 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959) (Friendly, J.).
00 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
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of the agent, 61 whom the defendants had never seen, was in a rather
insignificant paragraph of the lessor's lease form, signed by the defendants
in Michigan. Mr. Justice Black unsuccessfully argued that the New York
law of agency, under which he felt the agency would be invalid, should
be applied. The Court, however, construing rule 4(d)(1)'s provision for
service of an agent authorized by appointment to receive service or
process, held that under "this uniform Federal standard" a valid agency
had been created by the appointment in the lease form together with the
subsequent actions of the agent. 62 The holding implicitly recognized that
rule 4 sets up jurisdictional standards independent of state law.
Further support for the argument that a standard of jurisdiction over
corporations may be based on rule 4(f) could be drawn from Monarch
Ins. Co. v. Spach.63 In this diversity case rule 43(a)64 did not dearly
authorize the admission of a statement given by the president of the
insured to the insurer, but it was admitted under an interpretation of
the rule despite the contention that it would be excluded under state law.
But the argument that the federal standard is simply an interpretation
of rule 4(f) and shares the rule's status seems neither to have been made
65
nor to have prevailed in any court of appeals case except Jaftex.
61 It appears from the opinions that the "agent" of the Michigan farmers was in
reality the wife of one of the officers of the lessor. 375 U.S. at 317.
62 375 U.S. at 316. A distinguishing point, and one responsible for much of the
confusion about personal jurisdiction over corporations, is that while in Szukhent the
Court was construing an express provision of rule 4(d)(1), the application of rule 4(f)
to corporations involves the construction of an implied requirement of a relationship
to the area of the state. Perhaps the true analogy to Szukhent would be presented if
rule 4(f) provided that a corporation to be served must be "doing business" within the
state and the contention were made that state decisions on the meaning of "doing
business" must be followed.
63 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
64 FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
65 Cases applying state law in a diversity action when clearly faced with the choice
between state and federal standards include, by circuits: First, Pulson v. American
Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (Ist Cir. 1948); Third, Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze
Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953); Seventh, Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d 893
(7th Cir. 1955); Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. W. E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485
(7th Cir. 1952); Eighth, Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Hilmes
v. Marlin Firearms Co., 136 F. Supp. 307 (D. Minn. 1955); Ninth, Kenny v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955). A number of cases have followed state
law when service was attempted under it via rule 4(d)(7) in circumstances which imply
that the courts felt that state law on jurisdiction over corporations must be applied
in a diversity case (by circuits): First, Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell
Aircraft Corp., 310 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1962); Fourth, Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304
F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962); Iliff v. American Fire Apparatus Co., 277 F.2d 360 (4th Cir.
1960); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960); Fifth, Stanga
v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959); Sixth, Shuler v. Wood, 198
F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Tenn. 1961); Eighth, Charles Keeshin, Inc. v. Gordon Johnson Co.,
109 F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Tenth, Walker v. General Features Corp., 319
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Although doing so less articulately, most courts reach the result of
Arrowsmith.66 Even though advocates of a state standard of jurisdiction
over corporations may recognize the relevance of rule 4(f) and concede
the supremacy of a clear federal rule or even of an interpretation of a
federal rule, they maintain that rule 4(f) is not clear and that a congressionally authorized standard of jurisdiction cannot be developed by
mere interpretation of the rule.67 Rather, there is a gap, an interstice, in
the rule, 68 and the standard filling in that omission does more than
merely interpret and must stand or yield to state law wholly on its own. 69
The advocates of a federal standard are willing to defend their position
on this ground as well; they argue that even if the federal standard
cannot be satisfactorily tied to congressional authority the federal courts
are free to develop their own standards in diversity as well as federal
70
question cases.
II.

APPLICATION OF A FEDERAL STANDARD IN

DivERsiTY CASES

The problem of applying state standards of personal jurisdiction over
corporations would have been with us even without the Erie decision,
since these standards are almost always statutory.7 ' Yet apparently the
leading case requiring their application in diversity actions was decided
as recently as 1948,72 ten years after Erie. This raises two questions: How
was the question of a standard of jurisdiction over corporations treated
before Erie? How and why has Erie changed this?
F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th

Cir. 1949).
The only case which has been found that faced the choice of law and chose the
federal standard in a diversity case outside the Second Circuit is Pike v. New Eng.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 669 (D. Mass. 1950). Of the cases citing Jaftex, none
outside the Second Circuit appears to have followed it.
66 Cases cited note 65 supra.

67 "No federal statute or Rule of Civil Procedure speaks to the issue either expressly
or by fair implication." 320 F.2d at 225. (Emphasis added.)
08 The majority in Arrowsmith expressed the belief "that neither the federal legislature nor the federal rule-makers have had any intention to displace state statutes ...
which it felt were otherwise applicable. 320 F.2d at 227. (Emphasis added.)
There are cases in which the courts indicated that they felt state law would have
to be applied in a diversity case even if there were a clear federal rule on the subject,
but, needless to say, the courts were not faced with that question and gave it little
consideration. This makes for weak dicta. See, e.g., Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. W. E.
Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952).
69 See Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248, 250 (i963).
70 See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 234, 240 (Clark, J., dissenting);
Pike v. New Eng. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D. Mass. 1950).
71 Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 19 REcoRD oF
N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 78 (1964).
72 Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (Ist Cir. 1948).
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Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of Decision
Act, provided:
That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials
at common law in the courts of the United States in cases in
73
which they apply.
The provision is continued in much the same form in the present
Judicial Code.7 4 Thus it would seem that if a federal court can find no
rule to resolve the controversy in the federal constitution or statutes, it is
required to turn to the law of the state if a state law applicable to the
75
case exists.
But early in the history of the federal judiciary it became apparent
that section 34 did not pertain to all subjects of law, but only to those
characterized as "substantive.' 76 One indication of this was the passage,
immediately subsequent to passage of section 34, of the first Process
Act, 77 adopting state court procedure for federal courts. The need to
provide separately for the adoption of state practices in the area of
"procedure" indicates that such laws were not thought to have been
already adopted by section 34.78

But the personal jurisdiction standards of the district courts were found
to be governed by neither the Rules of Decision Act nor the Process
Act. 79 And although there were two provisions in section 11 of the
Judiciary Act-one on civil arrest and the other on bringing suit 8s conceded by the courts to be relevant to personal jurisdiction, the
dominant view was that restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of the
73 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
74 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
75 See Vestal, supra note 69, at 250-51.
76 See DoBmE, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION AND PROCEDURE 559 (1928).
77 "[T]he forms of writs and executions, except their style, and modes of process
*..in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in
each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same."
1 Stat. 93 (1789). "Modes of process" was construed to mean "modes of proceeding"
in Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 609, 610 (No. 11,134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828).
78 See Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MxcH. L. REv. 937,
938 (1951).
79 See Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 609, 610 (No. 11,134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828); Ex
parte Graham, 10 Fed. Cas. 911 (No. 5657) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818).
80 "But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil
action before a circuit or district court. And no civil suit shall be brought before
either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process,
in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be
found at the time of serving the writ ...." I Stat. 79 (1789).
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courts arose from the organization of the courts itself. In Picquet v.
Swan,81 it was argued that personal jurisdiction of a United States citizen
domiciled abroad could be established under a state attachment statute
which, it was contended, was made applicable by the Process Act. In
rejecting this argument, Mr. Justice Story discussed personal jurisdiction
in light of the section 11 provisions and concluded:
That by the general provisions of the laws of the United States,
the Circuit Courts could issue no process beyond the limits of
their districts. That independent of positive legislation, the
process can only be served upon persons within the same
districts . ...

.2

Mr. Justice Story's reasoning on this point was endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Toland v. Sprague.8 3 The prevalence of this view is further
indicated by Ex parte Graham,8 4 in which Mr. Justice Washington,
noting that special provisions had been made by Congress for the extraterritorial service of subpoenas and executions even though they were not
within the restriction imposed by section 11, stated:
It would seem, that these provisions were made, not because
they were supposed by congress to be necessary, in consequence
of the 1lth section of the judiciary law; but because the jurisdiction of the courts, was essentially confined, by their organization, within the limits of their respective districts .... 85
Hence it seems that, in the absence of federal legislation, standards of
personal jurisdiction were to be deduced by the federal courts from the
character of the federal judiciary, without regard to state personal
jurisdiction statutes.
Questions of personal jurisdiction over corporations were so treated.8 6
Section 11 said nothing of the requirements of jurisdiction over corporations.8 7 Until the second half of the nineteenth century the federal courts
inferred from the discussion of the existence of a corporation in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle88 that a corporation could not be sued except in the
state of its incorporation. 89 The proliferation of multi-state corporations
81
82
83
84
85

19 Fed. Cas. 609 (No. 11,134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828).
Id. at 615. (Emphasis added.)
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).
10 Fed. Cas. 911 (No. 5657) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818).
Id. at 912.

86 See HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTrru-

TIONAL LAw 87 (1918).
87 Quoted supra note 80.

88 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517 (1839).
89 Pomeroy v. New York & N.H.R.R., 19 Fed. Cas. 965 (No. 11,261) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.

768

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:752

made these holdings highly impractical, however, and they were overruled in Ex parte Schollenberger.90 Suit was there allowed against a
foreign corporation which had been required to consent to be sued in the
courts of the state as a condition of being allowed to do business in the
state. The Supreme Court construed the consent exacted by the state to be
consent to suit in the federal courts as well, but made it clear that the
state statute was not being adopted; the statute and the consent of the
corporation had merely brought about a state of facts which enabled the
federal court to take the case.91 Clearly it was not any assumed compulsion of the Rules of Decision Act which made the state statute relevant
in the federal court.
Not long after the turn of the century the consent theory gave way to
one of presence; the corporation was deemed to be present if doing
business within the district.92 The personal jurisdiction of the district
court was no longer dependent upon a state statute exacting consent.9 3
Indeed state statutes would seem to have lost all relevance to district
court personal jurisdiction by this time. Conformity to current state court
procedure was required by the Conformity Act, 94 which had been passed
five years before the Schollenberger decision, but it was expressly held
that even under the state service of process statutes thus adopted the
territorial limit on service was the district, not the state.95 Thus state
personal jurisdiction standards were not adopted by either the Rules of
Decision Act or the Conformity Act and only partial reliance was placed
upon the potentially controlling statutory provisions of section 11 and its
successors. Personal jurisdiction was neither substantive nor procedural
but incidental to the organization of the federal judiciary, from which
the courts deduced their own standards of personal jurisdiction over
corporations.
In 1938 both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the decision in
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins96 came into being, with the result that the
1857); Day v. Newark India-Rubber Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. Cas. 245 (No. 3865) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1850).
90 96 U.S. 369 (1877).
91 Id. at 377.
92 Note, 35 COLum. L. REv. 591, 593 (1935).
93 Ibid.
94 17 Stat. 196 (1872).
95 Sewchulis v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 233 Fed. 422 (2d Cir. 1916); Dobie, op. cit.
supra note 76, at 593; Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J.
387, 410 n.109 (1935) ("[T]he process of a district court will not run into another district, even within the same state, although process of the state nisi prius court would
run throughout the state."); cf. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
96 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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foundation of the federal standard was weakened at the same time the
argument for the application of state standards was strengthened. The
new rules disturbed the existing federal standard of personal jurisdiction
over corporations in two ways. Rule 4(f) violated the sanctity of the
district boundaries by enlarging the area in which effective service of
process could be made from the district to the state in multi-district
states. 97 Although this development was resisted, it was finally upheld in
the Supreme Court.98 Thus the federal jurisdiction standards were detached from the organization of the judiciary and based in a rule.
In addition, subdivision (d)(7) of rule 4 authorized service in the
manner prescribed by the law of the state as an alternative to service
under other subdivisions of the rule.99 Because state statutes often
included substituted and extra-territorial service provisions-advantages
not otherwise provided in rule 4100-the federal courts were urged by
plaintiffs to employ them, despite subdivision (f)'s restriction of effective
service to the state.101 When a court acceded to this request, as most now
97 As originally adopted rule 4(f) read: "Territorial Limits of Effective Service. All
process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits
of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of the United States
so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state. A subpoena may be served within
the territorial limits provided in Rule 45." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See also Devier v. George
Cole Motor Co., 27 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1939); 1 EDMUNDS, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PRoCEDURE 172-73 (1938).
98 A few courts, citing rule 82, "These rules shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions
therein," resisted the expansion of personal jurisdiction and continued to require
service of process within the district. Carby v. Greco, 31 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Ky. 1940);
Melekov v. Collins, 30 F. Supp. 159 (S.D. Cal. 1939). But the Supreme Court upheld
the expansion in Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1945), by construing
the rule 82 prohibition against a rule's affecting "jurisdiction" to refer only to subject
matter jurisdiction.
99 "Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) or this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served ...
in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the service is made for
the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in any action
brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7)
(as originally adopted).
100 It is ironic that the current supporters of the application of state standards regard them as more restrictive than a federal standard. Even the recent amendments
to the rules left the adopted state extraterritorial service provisions as the only such
provisions generally available in the district courts. It is conceivable that a situation
might arise in which a court determined that a corporation was within the federal
standard of jurisdiction and yet the corporation had no agent within the state to whom
notice could be given. In order to notify the corporation the court would have to
use the state provision for extraterritorial notification, unless it was willing to abandon
compliance with the rules. The only exceptions to rule 4(f)'s limitation of service to
the state are federal statutes, which are not generally applicable, and other rules so
providing. In their amended form only rule 4(e) provides general extraterritorial service of summons and that only by adoption of state law.
101 Some courts construed rule 4(d)(7) as adopting only the mechanics of giving notice,
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have and indeed must under the new amendments to rules 4(e) and
2
4(f),10
it found itself, in addition to applying the state notification
formalities which it had used under the Conformity Act, applying for the
first time the jurisdictional standards that were an integral part of the
extraterritorial service statutes. 103 Thus the new rules had the effect of
loosening not only the boundaries of the district, but also those of the
state. And the courts became accustomed to using the state jurisdiction of
corporations standards.
A few months before the Federal Rules took effect the Court handed
04
down its decision in Erie. The decision overruled Swift v. Tyson1
which had held that the word "laws" in the Rules of Decision Act did not
include state decisional law of a general nature, but only statutory and
limited by subdivision (f) to being carried out within the state. McCoy v. Siler, 205
F.2d 498, 501 (3d Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion); Smith v. Alexandrian, 30 F.R.D. 553,
555-56 (N.D. Ill. 1961). More recently the weight of authority has maintained that state
extraterritorial service provisions could be adopted under subdivision (d)(7) and were
not limited by subdivision (f). Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307, 310-11 (3d Cir. 1956);
Berk v. Bailey, 31 F.R.D. 201, 205 (W.D.S.C. 1962); Kappus v. Western Hills Oil, Inc.,
24 F.R.D. 123, 127 (E.D. Wis. 1959). See also 1 BARRON & HOLTzOFF § 184; Comment,
27 U. CHI. L. REv. 751 (1960).
This result was termed "salutary" by the Advisory Committee in its notes to the
recent amendments. ADVISORY Co~imrrr
ON CrvIL RULEs, NoTE TO RULE 4(d)(7), H.R.
Doc. No. 67, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The changes made in those amendments no
longer require that interpretation to reach the result, however. Authorization for the
use of state extraterritorial service statutes was specifically made in subdivision (e)
which was amended to read: "Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found within
State.... Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court
is held provides (1) for service of a summons . . . upon a party not an inhabitant of
or found within the state ... service may . . . be made under the circumstances and
in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule." Hence subdivision (d)(7) adopts only
the manner of service within the state. 2 MOORE
4.32 [approved in ADVISORY COImiTrEE ON CIVIL RULES, NOTE TO RULE

4(e), H.R. Doc. No. 67, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.

(1963)]. But see Vestal, Expanding the JurisdictionalReach of the Federal Courts: The
1963 Changes in FederalRule 4, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1053, 1056 (1963).
Subdivision (f) was amended to allow extraterritorial service pursuant to subdivision
(e): "All process . .. may be served . . . when authorized . . . by these rules, beyond
the territorial limits of that state." FFo. R. Civ. P. 4(f.
102 See note 101 supra.
103 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 262.09(4) (1957): "If the defendant is a foreign
corporation . . . and (a) is doing business in Wisconsin at the time of service, or (b)
the cause of action against it arose out of the doing of business in Wisconsin, service
may be made . . . by delivering within or without the state a copy of the summons
to any officer, director or managing agent of the corporation." Any notion that only
the state manner of giving notice is adopted and that the accompanying specification
of required relations to the state is not, is clearly refuted by the amended provision in
subdivision (e) that "service may . . . be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed in the [state] statute or rule." FED. R. Cwv. P. 4(e). Certainly the
circumstances contemplated can be none other than the personal jurisdiction relations
that are built into the state service of process statute.
104 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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purely local decisional law. Mr. Justice Brandeis's opinion, however,
contained references to the Constitution' 0 5 that have sparked a long and
lively debate whether the decision was constitutionally required, i.e.,
whether and to what extent Congress can provide the law to be applied
in diversity actions. 106 This controversy does not bear directly on the
choice of standards of jurisdiction over corporations, since it is generally
agreed that even if the result in Erie were constitutionally required
Congress could provide standards of personal jurisdiction to be applied
in diversity cases. 107
But Erie has had a significant indirect effect on the choice of standards
of jurisdiction to be applied in a diversity action. The language of the
opinion invited reexamination of the reasons for the application of state
law. Of the course of the reexamination conducted in subsequent cases, it
has been observed:
One point is dear: application of the Erie principle has spread
beyond the Erie decision itself. Erie was a construction of the
Rules of Decision Act, holding that the decision law of a state
was as much "state law" as was statutory law; in contrast all
three of the most recent Erie decisions [Cohen, Ragan &
Woods]l0 8 involved the problem whether a state statute was
within Erie. It is apparent that what Mr. Justice Rutledge called
the "gloss" of Erie has extended the doctrine beyond the narrow
decision of the Erie case; this gloss has developed around the
105 "If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be
prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But
the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels
... 304 U.S. at 77-78.
us to do so.
"There is no federal general common law." Id. at 78. "We merely declare that in
applying the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in
our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states." Id. at 80. Judge
Clark characterized these as somewhat unnecessary "sledge-hammer blows." Clark, State
Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE
L.J. 267, 295 (1946).
106 See Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the TerritorialReach of Federal
Process, 8 VML. L. REv. 520, 523-31 (1963); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New
FederalCommon Law, 19 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 64 (1964); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and
the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. Rav. 427, 541 (1958); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 188-204
(1957); Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248, 252-56
(1963); Comment, .The ConstitutionalPower of Congress to Control Procedure in the
Federal Courts, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 560 (1961).
107 See Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 394, 400 (1956); authorities cited note 106 supra,
except Abraham.
108 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337
U.S. 530 (1949).
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principle of uniformity of result in a given case, whether suit is
brought in state or federal court .... V0
This expansion has in part been brought about by repeated attempts to
reformulate the test to determine whether state or federal law ought to
be applied. The substantive-procedural test associated with the Rules of
Decision Act-which had not required the application of state statutes
providing for jurisdiction over corporations-enjoyed a term of popularity,11 but its shortcomings were laid bare by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York."' Declaring that in diversity cases the
federal court was "in effect, only another court of the State," 1 2 Justice
Frankfurter proposed that the test be whether disregarding the particular
state law would significantly affect the result of a litigation, often referred
to as the "outcome-determinative"

test. 1 13 Once these views had been

announced there was no hope that the subject of personal jurisdiction
over corporations would remain untouched by the application of state law
controversy. 114 This, together with the previously indicated developments
that had unsettled the pre-1938 conception of district court personal
jurisdiction, 115 made inevitable a decision like that in Pulson v. American
117
Rolling Mill Co.,116 which almost assumed state law had to be applied.
109 Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test to Determine Those Rules of State
Law to Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 So. CAL.. L. REv. 204, 212-13 (1950).
110 See Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271 (1939).
111 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
112 Id. at 108.

11 Id. at 109.
114 The outcome-determinative test has been criticized on the basis that even the
most procedural rules may significantly affect the outcome of a litigation. HART &
WzcSnssR 678. In some respects a personal jurisdiction standard might be considered
the archetype of such a rule. See text accompanying note 130 infra.
115 Traditional views of jurisdiction of corporations were themselves unsettled in
the same year as the York case. International Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310 (1945).
110 170 F.2d 193 (Ist Cir. 1948). The Seventh Circuit's decision that state law on
jurisdiction over corporations must be applied was even more casual. See Canvas
Fabricators, Inc. v. W.E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485, 486 (7th Cir. 1952).
117 There has been a continuing proliferation of tests since York. Each seems to
add more confusion since in addition to increasing the number of tests to consider,
the application of the particular test to a particular rule is usually unclear. Some of
the tests follow: Whether application of a different rule in the federal court promotes
forum shopping, Horowitz, supra note 109, at 215; whether a rule affects conduct at
the stage of primary private activity, HART & WEcnsREa 678; whether a rule in advance
of trial, taken in the abstract, is such as to substantially favor one side or the other
in litigation, Kurland, Book Review, 67 HARv. L. Rxv. 906 (1954). Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949) ("[I]n diversity cases the federal court
administers the state system of law in all except details related to its own conduct of
business.')
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The subsequent acceptance of the Pulson decision makes it clear that
the time is past for successfully arguing that personal jurisdiction over
corporations is a subject exempt from the application of state law
controversy. 118 The issue of the proper standard of jurisdiction over
corporations to apply in the absence of clear congressional direction must
be determined in the present Erie framework.
A change in approach to state-federal choice of law questions is the
most striking feature of post-Erie doctrine. The apparently boundless
broadening of scope has spawned an effective presumption that any
possibly relevant state law ought to be applied whenever a state-created
right is being adjudicated. 119 It is fashionable, it will be seen,' 20 to weigh
the relevant state and federal interests, but there is a burden of persuasion placed upon the advocate of federal law; he must justify "displacing" the state law.121 In what were traditionally non-substantive areas
not included by the choice of law controversy-e.g., personal jurisdiction
of corporations-this shift of burden is most keenly felt and may be
decisive. 122 The burden has, however, been met in -afew significant cases.
The foremost of these is Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc.,123
in which the defendant's immunity to the plaintiff's common-law personal
injury action depended on whether it was a "statutory employer" under
the state workmen's compensation act. The state supreme court had held
that this issue was to be determined by the judge, not a jury. The
defendant contended that the holding must be followed "to secure
24
uniform enforcement of the immunity created by the state."'
The court first put the issue in perspective by stating that the method
118 See I BARRON & HOLTZO'F § 179, at 696; cases cited note 65 supra.
119 The most striking example of this in the area of jurisdiction of corporations is

found in Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. W.E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th
Cir. 1952).

See text accompanying notes 128-29 infra.
See Vestal, supra note 106, at 259-72. "Displace" is the term used by Judge
Friendly in Arrowsmith. 320 F.2d at 227. This approach is clearly indicated by the
characterization of the federal interests as "countervailing considerations." See text
accompanying note 128 infra. Contrast the following statement of Judge Clark: "I
believe there is good ground for the view that the federal courts are not required to
and, in view of the federal rules, should not, hold that an issue traditionally procedural
or on the border line is substantive unless the public policy of the state, as unequivocally disclosed by some clear state statute or decision, demands such a result." Clark,
The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, I F.R.D. 417, 419 (1941).
122 Assuming a hypothetical, purely neutral federal rule, the mere inclusion of the
subject of the rule within the Erie controversy together with the imposition of a burden
of persuasion that the state law should not be applied-which would, by hypothesis,
be impossible to meet-would require that the state law be applied.
123 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
124 Id. at 534.
120

121
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of determining a fact neither constituted, nor was so bound up with, a
state-created right and obligation that federal courts must unquestionably
apply the state rule.125 The same may be said of a rule of jurisdiction over
corporations.
The Court did, however, recognize the "broader policy" of conformity
in the post-Erie cases and went on to consider the issue in the context
that even a non-substantive state rule might have to be applied in the
absence of federal legislation if disregarding it would significantly affect
the result of the case.126 In the course of this consideration the court
dispelled any illusions that the outcome-determinative category was allinclusive or all-powerful. That there are limits to the scope of the
category is shown by the Court's holding that there was not even a
"strong possibility" that the result of the case would be different if the
statutory employer issue were determined by a jury rather than by a
judge. 27 Moreover, it was held that even if the choice were labelled outcome-determinative that did not irrevocably decree that the state law
must be applied; indeed, the state decision giving the statutory employer
issue to the judge was not followed because of the "affirmative countervailing consideration" that distribution of trial functions between judge
and jury-including a "federal policy" in favor of jury determinations of
disputed questions of fact' 28-was an essential characteristic of the in129
dependent federal judiciary.
Is a rule of jurisdiction over corporations as neutral as the rule under
consideration in Byrd? A literal application of the outcome-determinative
test stamps the choice of jurisdiction standards as having a substantial
affect on the result of the suit, since in the only cases in which it makes
any difference the defendant is subject to suit under one and not the
other.130 Yet cause for reluctance to automatically apply state law is given
by the obvious fact that such a choice says nothing of whether the
plaintiff should be granted the requested relief. Just as the choice in
Byrd is who should decide factual issues, the choice in Arrowsmith is
where the issues should be decided. Both have a ring of neutrality. Thus
there is a significant question whether the choice of jurisdiction standards
affects the outcome; it may determine the outcome of this particular
125

Id. at 536.

126

Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 539.

127

128 No statute or rule required the jury determination. The Court acknowledged
the seventh amendment as evidence of a federal policy in favor of jury determinations,
but expressly denied resting upon the possibility of a constitutional right to a jury trial.
Id. at 537 n.10.
129

Id. at 537-38.

130 See Abraham, supra note 106, at 528.
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attempt to sue in this particular court, but the resolution on the merits of
the grievance between the parties is wholly unaffected.13 '
But even if there is a strong possibility that the choice will "affect the
result of the litigation," whatever that means, Byrd indicates that the
state law will not be applied in the face of a significant contrary federal
policy. The policy of favoring jury decisions in factual disputes apparently reflects a judgment that the decisions reached in federal courts
are more likely to be sound if a jury passes on the facts. What federal
reason might there be for applying an independent judge-made rule of
jurisdiction over corporations, presumably requiring less connection with
the forum than that of the state, in a diversity action? The generally
accepted basis for diversity jurisdiction is a federal interest in providing
an alternate, unbiased forum for the nonresident party apprehensive
of the treatment he might receive in the courts of the state in which he is
litigating. 5 2 This is no reason for requiring a corporate defendant to
defend a diversity action in a federal court held in a state whose courts
have no power over him. Apart from the inconvenience of the forum, it
131 In sustaining the validity of rule 4(f) the Supreme Court said, "Undoubtedly
most alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may and often do affect the
The fact that the application of Rule 4(f) will operate to subject
rights of litigants ....
petitioner's rights to adjudication by the district court for northern Mississippi will
undoubtedly affect those rights. But it does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify
the rules of decision by which that court will adjudicate its rights." Mississippi Pub.
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946).
It has been observed that in certain situations the application of a broader standard
of personal jurisdiction by the federal courts might subject a defendant's rights to
a body of substantive law to which they were not otherwise subject. In such a situation it might be inaccurate to say the resolution on the merits is wholly unaffected
by the personal jurisdiction standard. See Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (pt. 1), 77 HARV. L. REv. 601, 633-34 (1964).
132 See ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 39 (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 30, 1963). Indeed, were we willing to concede that
protection of the out-of-state defendant against provincial state bias is the only reason
for entertaining diversity actions, the application of a broader federal standard of
personal jurisdiction would be an unwarranted extension of diversity jurisdiction.
Where there is no power over a defendant there can be no bias exerted against him.
But if the role of diversity jurisdiction was ever so limited, it is not now. The new
100 mile "bulge" provision of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f), providing jurisdiction over certain
third parties who could not otherwise be joined, gives an indication of its more modern
utility. Facilitating multi-party litigation which no one state can handle is a useful
federal function. Discussion of the provision supports its use and validity in diversity
actions. Kaplan, supra note 131, at 632; Vestal, supra note 101, at 1059-71. But see,
Abraham, supra note 106, at 523, 535.
A recent comment has pointed out an equally appealing two-party litigation in
which the federal courts could perform a similar function by employing a uniform
federal standard not afflicted with customary state standard requirements that the
action be brought by a resident or arise out of acts done within the state. Comment,
Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and the Erie Doctrine, 64 COLUm. L.
REv. 685, 706 (1964).
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might be unfair to subject him to the substantive or choice of law rules
of that state when the state itself could not do so. 133
Should the federal standard be applied because it presumably will
encompass more potential defendants? This is not prima facie meritorious. The federal system performs a valid function, perhaps even a
duty, in providing a forum for the resolution of controversies that no one
state can resolve completely. 34 The exercise of this function in multiparty litigation is evidenced by the recent amendment to rule 4(f) allowing service of process anywhere within 100 miles of the district court,
regardless of state lines, to bring in certain third parties. Certainly this is
salutary and could justify application of a broad federal standard in
multi-party litigation, but this reason disappears in two-party litigation,
e.g., Arrowsmith.13 5
A federal interest in the uniformity of the non-substantive rules
applied in the federal courts might be advanced, 136 but this point
assumes the question whether the particular rule is one that requires
uniformity. Moreover, the argument is betrayed by the fact that state
law is incorporated by reference in several of the federal rules themselves,
37
notably rules 4(d)(7) and 4(e).1

It could be argued that a personal jurisdiction standard represents a
significant policy of the federal judiciary-the manner in which it
allocates judicial business. By analogy to Byrd, this argument would
seem to be entitled to respect, but its factual foundation and the
significance of the supposed policy are questionable. The broader the
standard, the less it resembles a provision to channel litigation efficiently
among the districts. Moreover, it must be recognized that the personal
jurisdiction standard is not customarily viewed in this manner.
Perhaps an inquiry into motive will reveal the federal interest; it is
dear why a plaintiff might urge the adoption of the more far-reaching
federal standard, but why would a court buy the argument? The primary
motivation of the "disinterested" advocates of a federal standard seems to
be a strong conviction, similar to that articulated in Byrd, that this is an
"essential characteristic" of the independent federal judiciary. 188 For
Judge Clark it was a symbol of the independence of the federal courts:
supra note 106, at 528; Kaplan, supra note 131, at 633-34.
See Abraham, supra note 106, at 521-22; Kaplan, supra note 131, at 632-34.

183 See Abraham,

134
185
136
Ladd,
237
138
States
not a

But see note 132 supra.
Cf. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. RFv. 275 (1962);
Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REv. 692 (1963).
HART & WECHsLrE 589.
Cf. Monarch Insurance Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1960): "A United
District Court clothed with power by Congress pursuant to the Constitution is
mere adjunct to a state's judicial machinery."

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

1964]

"Over-all is the issue of national subservience to the divisive policies of
the [state] statute, a pattern of law at best belittling and undignified for
the national courts ...."139 The independence of the federal courts is,
like motherhood, a salutary cause, but it is also a rather general principle
that must yield to a significant state interest that might be disserved by
failure to apply the state standard in diversity actions.
Advocates of the application of a state standard attempt to draw
support for their position from two Supreme Court cases barring suit by
plaintiffs in diversity actions when suit on the same cause would have
been barred by the state, Angel v. Bullington140 and Woods v. Interstate
Realty Go.1 4 ' With regard to these cases it was said in Arrowsmith:
[I]t seems immaterial that in such cases the state policy is expressed as a dosing of the door against a particular kind of suit
or plaintiff rather than as a refusal to pull a particular kind of
defendant through the door.1 42
In Angel a state policy against deficiency judgments would have been
defeated if they could have been obtained in the district court; the rule
was dearly bound up with state-created rights. In Woods the state's
attempt to influence foreign corporations to "qualify" to do business by
barring access to the courts if they did not would have been frustrated
by allowing them to sue in the federal courts. But what state policy will
be frustrated by allowing foreign corporations to be sued in the district
courts even though they are not amenable to suit in the state court?
The significant interest of the state would seem to be providing, insofar
as it can, a local forum for residents who have been wronged by foreign
corporations. It is not seen how the state would suffer if the federal court
43
furthered that objective.
It might be argued that restrictions on amenability to suit of foreign
corporations-such as requirements that the suit be by a resident or arise
out of incidents occurring within the state-represent a policy of avoiding the discouragement of business activity within the state by such
corporations. 4 4 If the premise-that corporations attach significant
139 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 240 (2d Cir. 1963).
140

330 U.S. 183 (1947).

141
142

337 U.S. 535 (1949).
320 F.2d at 227.

143

See Note, 56 COLUM. L. Rlv. 394, 399-400 (1956). Likewise, a state might decline

to subject foreign corporations to suit on out-of-state claims to reduce the costs of
administering courts or to lighten workloads, but it would in no way defeat this pur-

pose if the federal courts allowed actions against those corporations on such claims.
Note, 69 HARV. L. REv. 508, 524 (1956).
t44 Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 521-22 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1960).
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weight to possible amenability to suit in determining whether to expand
-were true, this might be a point well taken. Some evidence of its truth
is the manner in which corporations conduct their activities outside their
home states, e.g., recall the careful solicitation procedures described in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 45 Yet the argument that such
restrictions evidence a definite state policy must be discounted by the
observation that they quite possibly represent only attempts to preserve
the onstitutionality of the statute while providing the maximum possible
14 6
use of the local forum to resident plaintiffs.
As in the case of the federal interest inquiry, additional insight into
the state policies may be gained by inquiring into the motives of the
"disinterested" advocates of the application of state law. Frequent quotations of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement that in diversity cases the
federal court is, "in effect, only another court of the State" reveal the
sentiment that in order not to interfere with the state's administration
of justice the federal system should bend in the direction of cooperation
with the state; when in doubt, apply state law. 147 Accordingly, the
inclination is that even in the non-substantive area state law should
always be applied unless a federal statute, rule or significant policy has
displaced it.
This view has its counterpart in the previously mentioned notion of
preserving the integrity of the independent federal judiciary. Both these
are general "philosophies" of federalism, not specific policies linked
directly to standards of personal jurisdiction over corporations. Indeed,
there seem to be no such specific policies of any strength on either side.
The impression cannot be avoided that the choice of a standard of
jurisdiction over corporations has innocently become the scene of a clash
of these two philosophies. Weighed against each other they seem to cancel, but the view of the majority in Arrowsmith is dearly the more
popular. All that can be offered for those disturbed by this situation is
an analysis of how it came about and a suggested way to change it. The
game was given away when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure uprooted the standard of personal jurisdiction from its basis in the district
organization of the federal courts, where it had been immune to the
application of state law challenge. When the rules failed to provide what
the standard of jurisdiction over corporations should be, that immunity
was completely lost. And once the standard became embroiled in the application of state law controversy, the application of state standards be326 U.S. 310 (1945).
146 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 1963).
147 Abraham, supra note 106, at 521-22.
145
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came inevitable because of the emerging presumption that state law
should be applied unles' displaced.
If, as is unlikely, 14 8 sufficient dissatisfaction with this state of affairs
should develop, it could be cured by amendment to rule 4.149 If this
is done it should be accompanied by a thorough reevaluation of personal
jurisdiction, venue and notice as they apply to corporations in the
federal courts. 150
148 See ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS §§ 1301-03 (rent. Draft No. 1, April 30, 1963). The distinguished members of
the Council submitting the study, which recommends restrictions on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, proposed that the personal jurisdiction of the district court, be, in
general, limited to that of the courts of the state in which it sits in diversity actions.
149 It could be questioned whether the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intended to establish federal standards of personal jurisdiction independent of
state law. In the materials recording the development of the original federal rules can
be found an interesting exchange of correspondence between William D. Mitchell,
Chairman of the Rules Advisory Committee, Dean, later Judge, Charles E. Clark, the
Reporter, and a Mr. Lee 0. Gregory, a member of the bar. Mr. Gregory, having seen
a copy of the April 1936 Preliminary Draft of the rules, in which the provisions now
in rule 4(d)(7) were located in rule 4(c)(6), suggested that the rules include a provision
for service of non-residents similar to the Iowa statute which had been recently sustained by the Supreme Court in Henry L. Doherty Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
The reply of Dean Clark to Mr. Gregory's suggestion seems somewhat inconsistent with
the more recently expressed views of Judge Clark: "I note your present suggestion that
we should go further and have a federal rule of the same effect where no rule exists
in the states. This is a matter which our Committee should consider somewhat further, and I am wondering whether they will wish to go this far, inasmuch as they
have generally taken the position of not wishing to go beyond state policy in matters
of jurisdiction. This might well be claimed to be a substantial extension, no matter
how desirable it is. . . . When a state announces such a policy, it can well be taken
over into the federal courts. Should this be done in the absence of a state policy to
that effect?" 6 U.S. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Rules for Civil Procedure,
Materials--Letter of Charles E. Clark to Lee 0. Gregory dated June 22, 1936 (1938)
(unpublished, unpaginated collection of materials). See also letter of Lee 0. Gregory
to William D. Mitchell dated June 12, 1936, and Letter of William D. Mitchell to
Charles E. Clark dated June 16, 1936, included in the same volume of materials.
150 The plausible reform would seem to be one stripping service of process of all
personal jurisdiction aspects, i.e., limiting its function solely to notification without
regard to territorial limits, and replacing the -muddled, three-pronged attempt to
locate the proper place for trial which now inheres in concepts of venue, personal
jurisdiction and service of process with a single, comprehensive statute or rule using
convenience of the parties and witnesses, access to evidence, etc., as the factors in locating the trial. See Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REv. 608, 628-29 (1954); cf. Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 394,
420 (1956).

